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‘Paralysed associations’: countertransference difﬁculties in
recognising meaning in the treatment of children on the autistic
spectrum
Maria Rhode*
Department of Children & Families, Tavistock & Portman NHS Foundation Trust, 120 Belsize
Lane, London NW3 5BA, UK
Children with autism can have a paralysing effect on the clinician’s capacity to
associate freely: connections that seem obvious on reﬂection may be impossible to
notice in the child’s presence. The author argues that this situation can be reached
by more than one pathway, and that the degree of the child’s bodily and emotional
cohesion is an important factor. Children may seek to immobilise the therapist’s
thought processes through projective identiﬁcation, whether to communicate their
own experience of paralysis or because these thought processes are equated with a
parental intercourse that produces a ‘baby’ (as described by Bion and Britton).
Vignettes are offered to illustrate how the therapist may be nudged into overlooking
this baby as well as a potentially growing part of the child that is identiﬁed with it,
with important consequences for development. A second possible pathway appears
to involve the much more primitive mechanism of adhesive identiﬁcation, in which
the child’s sense of continuing existence depends on sticking to the therapist’s
surface and any movement can lead to a sense of bodily disintegration. In the
clinical illustration, the therapist felt physically constrained and unable to recognise
links in the material: it is suggested that this was in resonance with the child’s fear
that movement, whether physical or mental, meant losing parts of his body and
must be avoided at all costs. These levels can mask each other, and it seems
essential to attend to both in order to avoid impasse or the overlooking of essential
aspects of the child’s experience.
Keywords: adhesive resonance; countertransference; meaning; paralysis of thought;
projective identiﬁcation
My aim in this paper is to describe the paralysis of the capacity to think and to
recognise meaningful patterns that clinicians working with children on the autistic
spectrum often experience, and to illustrate two of the countertransference pathways
that can lead to this situation. Such paralysis is of course far from unique to autism,
but it does occur very frequently in the treatment of children on the spectrum. The
proportion of the work that is affected varies; at its worst, the clinician can spend much
of the time in a state of hopelessness about being able to recognise any meaningful
links or even to search for any possible approach to the difﬁculty.
*Email: mrhode@tavi-port.nhs.uk
An earlier version of this paper was read at the UCL Conference, ‘Free Association Today’,
London, 13th December 2014.
© 2015 Association of Child Psychotherapists
Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 2015
Vol. 41, No. 3, 218–230, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0075417X.2015.1090693
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
av
ist
oc
k &
 Po
rtm
an
] a
t 0
7:1
7 1
9 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
Melanie Klein, in her 1930 paper on ‘The importance of symbol formation in the
development of the ego’, wrote that she had to take an active role in getting her four-
year-old autistic patient Dick’s analysis underway by describing two toy trains as the
‘Daddy train’ and the ‘Dick train’. Since then, most writers on autism, including Tustin
(1972), Meltzer (1975: 15) and particularly Alvarez (1980), have agreed that the
clinician often needs to be more active than usual if contact is to be established. But
there are some cases in which it feels impossible to imagine any way in which one
could conceivably be active. Interpreting this as a countertransference communication
may not elicit any response. It can be a small step from recognising that this was not
meaningful for the child, to feeling that nothing possibly ever could be and to ﬁnding
oneself in an impasse in which important facets of the child’s experience and behaviour
are overlooked.
In attempting to understand how this may come about, I will discuss material from
three children. Of the various pathways that can lead to the clinician’s inability to make
links and recognise patterns, I will focus on the impact of projective identiﬁcation and
adhesive identiﬁcation, and I will suggest that the extent of bodily and emotional
cohesion that the child has achieved exerts an important inﬂuence on which pathway
seems to predominate.
Some children have developed sufﬁciently to make use of projective identiﬁcation
in order to affect the clinician’s thought processes. This may serve to communicate
their own experience of being unable to make links; it can also happen because these
thought processes are equated with a parental intercourse that produces a ‘baby’ (Bion,
1959; Britton, 1989). Material from a child, Sasha, which I discuss later in the paper
illustrates how the link between the parents can be experienced concretely as a
privileged baby whose existence leaves no room for the child. The clinician may then
be nudged to overlook the presence of this ‘baby’, as though responding to the child’s
wish for it not to exist (a process that Spillius (1988: 83) has called ‘evocatory
projective identiﬁcation’).1 I believe that this happened in the session I will refer to,
where the therapist, very uncharacteristically, did not notice what looked like a baby in
one of the child’s drawings. This can mean that the potentially growing part of the
child, which is identiﬁed with the ‘baby’, may be overlooked as well.
While this can be very striking, it is far less extreme than the clinician’s experience
of paralysis in cases where the much more primitive mechanism of adhesive
identiﬁcation seems to predominate. Bick (1968, 1986) has described how the child’s
sense of continuing existence can depend on feeling ‘stuck’ to surface qualities of the
therapist, so that any movement towards separation either mental or physical can lead
to an experience of falling apart physically as well as mentally. Durban (2014), in a
paper on the analyst’s oscillation between despair and hope in the treatment of ASD
children, has suggested that this oscillation can in fact serve a vital function in the
struggle against paralysis by opening up a three-dimensional mental space in the
treatment. In my third clinical illustration, the therapist was overwhelmed by feeling
physically constrained as well as mentally stuck and was unable to see any links in the
material. I will suggest that this was a reﬂection of the child’s fear that movement,
whether physical or mental, meant losing parts of his body and therefore had to be
avoided at all costs.
Before considering these two children whose therapists discussed them with me, I
will begin by describing my own experience with Jacky, where both of these pathways
seemed to be operating, with projective identiﬁcation masking adhesive phenomena. It
was not until I became aware of the primitive bodily level of his relationship to me
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that I was able to achieve any kind of perspective on his projected communications. I
will suggest more generally that children who appear not to be communicating may
actually be doing so, but that the impact of their adhesive defences on the clinician can
make it difﬁcult to attain the distance from the material that is necessary in order to
recognise these communications and respond to them.
Jacky: projective identiﬁcation masking adhesive phenomena
Jacky was three years and nine months when he came to three times weekly treatment
with a diagnosis of autism. At home, he spent all his waking hours ‘galloping’ up and
down the room, making the same loud, vibrating sound – “deeee-eee-ee”. His parents
were heartbroken: as they said, “we can’t get through to him at all”. They lent me videos
of his early life, which showed intense eye contact between him and his father soon after
birth. When he was three months old, his maternal grandfather died at the same time as
Jacky had corrective oral surgery. Further painful happenings followed, and the
cumulative impact of the family’s experiences seemed to be perpetuated in him on a
fundamental, bodily level. For example, when his mother told me about her father’s
death, she began to cry. Jacky shrieked, his thumb shot out of his mouth, and he shook
as though he were falling apart. It was as though his mother’s emotional losses were
equated with the loss of his own thumb and of his feeling of bodily coherence.
I realised of course that this little boy had had to endure experiences of extreme
pain and vulnerability at a time when his parents were themselves vulnerable and
unable to support him so much as they would have wished; but in the sessions I had to
struggle with an upsurge of hatred when he reacted to anything I said by smirking
triumphantly and galloping off. Attempts to interpret this as a communication, whether
of helplessness, impotence, abandonment, or indeed hatred, all led nowhere, and I felt
acutely that thinking of any meaningful link, let alone of any different or active
approach, was completely beyond me.
For many months, Jacky watched me carefully as I walked from the door over to
the table with his box, so that I could unlock the padlock and lift up the lid. He timed
his own walk to the table so that he arrived just after I had opened the box, and he
slammed down the lid with a triumphant grin. After that, other than galloping, he did
nothing for 50 minutes, and I could think of nothing. Even if I did manage to construct
an interpretation, this always felt contrived and it failed to convince me.
Then, one day, as I walked towards Jacky’s box, I reached into the pocket of my
overall in which I always kept the key, and it wasn’t there. I stopped walking while I
searched for it, and Jacky stopped too, with his eyes glued to me. When I ﬁnally found
the key in another pocket and began to walk again, he did as well. He slammed down
the lid as usual; but it felt completely different. It was a shock to realise that the way
he shadowed my footsteps, which had felt so implacable and triumphant, in fact
expressed the degree to which he was geared to me; and it softened my response to
him. Very gradually, his own behaviour began to soften slightly. He produced some
play that seemed to be meaningful; he could engage in a rudimentary game of rolling
things back and forth between us; and I heard that he was involving himself more at
school and using some words. Very occasionally my thought processes could escape
his tyrannical control. For example, something he did made me think of a particular
piece of music; one that was lively and full of rhythmical vitality. I felt able to tap out
the rhythm, and he came over to watch with pleasure and fascination, though he soon
reverted to his usual behaviour.
220 M. Rhode
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
av
ist
oc
k &
 Po
rtm
an
] a
t 0
7:1
7 1
9 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
How might one understand this? Was it simply a matter of my ﬁnding it a bit
easier to tolerate him once I had experienced his vulnerability on an emotional level,
not just intellectually – once I had had a brief respite from having to be the one who
was impotent, helpless and ﬁlled with hatred? Was he temporarily relieved to ﬁnd that
I was not always overwhelmed by hopelessness and depression; that my mental focus,
like the key, could go missing and be found again, whereas his mother’s bereavement
seemed to have remained unresolved? Did the fact that I was thinking about who was
in the grip of whom perhaps go some way towards loosening that grip, whoever was
exerting it – I on him, as I now realised that he felt; he on my thought processes; a
pathological organisation on his capacity to engage and develop? And what level of
experience was being evoked? Jacky’s triumphant smirk when he slammed his box
shut had suggested to me that he was making use of projective identiﬁcation to
communicate a helplessness and hatred that he had found overwhelming, and that my
difﬁculties largely stemmed from ﬁnding these feelings overwhelming too. But the
degree to which his walk to the table was completely geared to mine, and the way his
eyes were glued to me when the otherwise predictable opening to the session was
disrupted, suggested something much more primitive and body-centred; something in
the realm of adhesive identiﬁcation as Bick (1968) described it, where the child feels
that his survival depends on ‘sticking’ himself to the adult’s physical or behavioural
surface appearance.
Jacky’s treatment could not be described as successful. Not much happened that
helped to address my questions, though a good deal of material pointed to the severe
anxieties about losing body parts or body contents that Tustin (1986) thought were
typical of children on the autistic spectrum. It seemed clear that my extreme inability
to make associative links was at least in part being elicited by him, but I could not
tell whether he was evoking a depressed object or conveying his own mindlessness,
impotence and despair. He might have been communicating what it was like to live in
a meaningless world presided over by a sadistic ﬁgure. Equally, he might have been
interfering with links, whether in the way Bion (1959) described or for fear of
discovering a damaging link between himself and others (Cecchi, 1990).2
Alternatively, he could have been making use of projective identiﬁcation to evoke his
own experience of lacking alpha-function, as Bion (1992: 217) suggested in his
Cogitations. However this may be, what I wish to highlight is that Jacky had made
me feel as overwhelmed as he did, and that this was not in any way modiﬁable until
I achieved some degree of perspective on his terriﬁed need to stick to me in order to
survive.
In what follows, I will attempt to think further about this felt paralysis of the
clinician’s thought processes on the basis of material from two children whose
therapists discussed them with me, so that there was the possibility of an additional
perspective on the apparent absence of meaningful links.3 The ﬁrst vignette concerns
Sasha, a child with mild to moderate autism, whose therapist did not notice that his
drawing of a door contained the outline of a baby. This child experienced links very
concretely as privileged babies who were allowed to exist between the parental couple
and who left no room for him. Sasha also had a concept of internal spaces. I will
suggest that, unlike many children on the spectrum (see, for example, Meltzer, 1975:
18; Tustin, 1990b: 44), he was able to make use of projective identiﬁcation, and did so
to elicit a state of mind in which his therapist overlooked a baby.
Such a failure to notice something because of the child’s projections is of course
not the same thing as paralysis. In the case of the second child, Mohammed, whose
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autistic withdrawal was much more severe, the therapist felt an overwhelming anxiety
that she could recognise no meaningful links in the material, but also that she and the
child would forever remain stuck. She described this anxiety as excruciating, and
sometimes experienced it as a physical constraint. This child too had achieved the idea
of an internal space, but often seemed dominated by the fear that any movement could
mean losing a part of his body, so that the free movement of the therapist’s thoughts
involved in making meaningful links would have posed a severe threat. I had reason to
know that both therapists were sensitively in touch with their patients, and not
normally in the habit of overlooking meaningful connections.
Sasha: ‘evocatory’ projective identiﬁcation and thoughts as rival babies
Sasha began three times weekly treatment with his therapist, whom I will call Mrs. A.,
when he was three and a half. He was not severely autistic: he had a fair amount of
language, and his parents said that he was eager to approach the adults at his special
nursery, though he was often overlooked because he did not seem to know what to do to
attract their attention. His parents were particularly worried by his obsession with doors,
door-handles and hinges, which attracted unwelcome comments whenever they took him
out.4 When Sasha came for his ﬁrst individual assessment session, this obsession meant
that it took 20 minutes to get him to the therapy room. In Mrs. A.’s words:
Clinging to the handle of the main door in the waiting-room was the jumping-bean ﬁgure
of Sasha, yelping and chuntering, “Open da door…Door shut…Hullo, it’s Sasha…
goodbye”, as he tugged open the door, bounced and yelped to the other side, examined
the handle, the latch, the hinge, bounced back, banged it shut…
Early in his treatment, Sasha would hit and bite his therapist, throw his toys about, cut
them in pieces and stamp about the room. Typically he then became concerned about
the state of the door hinge: “Oh no, da hinge is broken”, only to rush off to tug at the
handle of a locked cupboard: “Can-a get in?” Mrs. A. and I wondered how far he was
alluding to a fear of being responsible for the severe depression his mother had
suffered after his birth, and how far his anxiety about breaking things was responsible
for his inability to persevere in opening his box.
Sasha seemed to experience hinges and links very concretely as rival babies. For
instance, after some months he stuck the posts of two of his toy gates into a small
lump of Play-Doh that he called ‘Little Miss Tiny’. He then opened and closed these
gates to let a car through so that the ‘Little Miss Tiny’ bit of Play-Doh was in fact
functioning as a hinge. A bit later, when he had been snipping at a piece of string and
would have been concerned with damage, he suddenly asked, “Where Nicola?” (his
little sister) as though the damage involved her. Mrs. A. and I asked ourselves whether
Sasha confused an open door with one that had been broken, as many children on the
autistic spectrum seem to do; as though he were faced with the dilemma that an intact
‘Little Miss Tiny’-Nicola hinge meant that doors were closed to him, and that he could
not open them without doing damage. Such a confusion would go some way towards
explaining Sasha’s obsessive need to check the state of the hinge-baby on every door
he came across.
I will now refer to a session when Sasha was ﬁve, when he had been in treatment
for just over a year.
Sasha instructed Mrs. A. to pretend to ‘be angry’, and then began to throw things
about in an angry fashion himself. Next, he looked in his box for various things, and
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tended to panic and give up if he couldn’t ﬁnd them straight away – “oh, where did I
put it?” Mrs. A. found herself getting panicky too – had she failed to put these things
back in his box when she was tidying up? – even though she knew that this was not
realistic. She then wrote:
Sasha drew two parallel lines that might have been a road on a slight incline. Next he
drew what looked a bit like a witch’s hat. He moved the pencil a bit further up and
muttered, “Can’t,” before drawing what looked like a door. Suddenly, he swept up the
sheet of paper, dropped it on the ﬂoor, and tried to push buttons on the printer.
Something had clearly made Sasha anxious. When Mrs. A. asked him to tell her about
the drawing, he pointed to the triangle shape and said, “Black”. Then she asked about
the door shape (see Figure 1). He creaked, “A-a-a”, as though he were identiﬁed with a
broken hinge. Mrs. A. started to say that he needed to be sure he could come through
her door without breaking it and her. He crumpled the page, looked straight at her,
poked the corner into his mouth and sucked. “Dink of water”, he said. He seemed to be
worried that his ‘drinking’, too, was potentially damaging.
Now he grabbed the scissors and began snipping off the corners of the page while
‘chomping’ with his teeth. He cut further bits out of the sides. Mrs. A. watched
anxiously: she wanted to preserve this picture but managed to hold back. Then, she
wrote, Sasha ‘abandoned the picture and fetched himself another sheet of paper, on
which he quickly drew a perpendicular line of geometric shapes’. Sasha’s anxiety about
damage to something precious, which was resonating in Mrs. A., seemed to have
become too much for him at this point.
When Mrs. A. showed me the ﬁrst picture, I saw that the door contained something
that seemed to me a clear representation of a baby, though it was drawn in a
Figure 1. The door with the ‘baby’, from Sasha’s ﬁrst drawing.
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rudimentary way. When I asked Mrs. A. her opinion concerning this part of the
drawing, she too thought that there was a baby in the door; so much so that she was
very surprised not to have noticed it during the session. When she had asked Sasha
about the door shape, he had creaked “A-a-a” – might he have thought that the baby in
the door was damaged like a creaking hinge? In any case, he retreated to drawing
something more abstract. He then attempted to make good the damage done by his
‘chomping’ and cutting by sticking bits of paper back on – although onto an actual
door rather than the picture of one, as though he had become unsure about the
‘pretend’ status of what he was doing:
Sasha found a tiny paper label on the ﬂoor. He pressed a lump of Play-Doh on the back.
Scurrying to the cupboard, he clambered on to the upright chair and spent several minutes
trying the label in different positions. “You are trying to ﬁnd the right place for that label,
aren’t you, Sasha?” said Mrs. A. After several minutes he stood on the swivel chair to
continue with positioning his label: it looked very unstable, so she stood close by. Sasha
pointed at the door hinge: “Oh, no. It not working. It broken,” he said, pressing his label
on to it.
Sasha seems worried that his ‘chomping’ mouth removes an essential bit of the paper
that should not be removed. Does having a ‘dink of water’ mean that he damages a
baby-hinge and separates the two parts of his primitive combined object? The
physically precarious positions he gets into, and the creaking ‘A-a-a’ sound he makes
when Mrs. A. asks about the door, suggest how fragile the structure of his world seems
to feel, as well as his identiﬁcation with the vulnerable ‘hinge-baby’ that he seems to
think he has attacked by ‘chomping’.
Earlier in the session, Mrs. A. had resonated to Sasha’s fear that something
precious was missing, which implies that he was able to use projective identiﬁcation in
order to communicate by evoking feelings or states of mind in the therapist – what
Spillius (1988: 83) has called ‘evocatory’ projective identiﬁcation. However, although
Mrs. A. felt that Sasha’s ﬁrst drawing was important, she did not at the time recognise
that he had drawn a baby-like ﬁgure inside the door, which, as I have said, was very
unlike her. I suggest that Sasha was projecting a state of mind in which babies were
overlooked. This may have been an evocation of a depressed mother who could not
properly see his potential (an attitude he elicited in the nursery staff as well). Equally,
Sasha may have experienced Mrs. A.’s thought processes as her brain children by
whom he felt threatened, as Bion (1959) and Britton (1989) have described in
psychotic and borderline adults, and he may have tended to interfere with her capacity
to think on that account. If so, this was not a mere matter of jealousy: Sasha seemed to
experience the privileged hinge-baby as an existential threat because it blocked his
way in.
In fact, in the following sessions the theme of babies became much more explicit.
Sasha magically concocted a drink by stirring a speck of Play-Doh in a glass of water,
as though he were a father ‘cooking’ with a potent pencil. Later, he marked off an
inside space by miming a door in the middle of the room through which he went in
and out. By the end of the week, he volunteered that the Play-Doh specks were
“ba-bies”, which he pronounced with a ﬁerce grimace. Perhaps his chomping of these
“ba-bies” was stimulated by the phantasy that they were an essential ingredient of the
milk that a father generated inside a maternal space from which Sasha was excluded –
a phantasy similar to the one concerning the ‘Little Miss Tiny’ hinge.
To summarise so far: Mrs. A. had to deal with urgent anxieties about precious things
being lost, perhaps through her fault: anxieties which, as the subsequent material
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strongly suggests, Sasha was communicating to her by means of projective
identiﬁcation. In the light of this, I think that her failure to recognise Sasha’s ﬁrst
drawing as showing a baby may have been the result of a similar communication:
namely, that the presence of a baby (which he seemed to experience as a potential
threat) must not be acknowledged. Sasha showed the degree of his own anxiety about
the ‘baby in the door’ when he abandoned his ﬁrst drawing and reduced the ‘baby’ to
geometric shapes in the second. I would guess that Mrs. A.’s reception and containment
of this anxiety contributed to his later ability to bring ‘Ba-bies’ explicitly into the
material.
Mohammed: movement as bodily disintegration, and adhesive resonance in the
therapist
Sasha’s autism was not very severe: he was beginning to conceive of bounded spaces
inside a mother ﬁgure and, unlike many children on the spectrum, he could make use
of communicative projective identiﬁcation, even if his personiﬁcation of links as
privileged babies remained very concrete. The next child I would like to discuss was
much more typical of children with autism: he could sometimes imagine inside spaces
and happenings, but easily reverted to the position that Bick (1968) and Meltzer (1974)
called adhesive identiﬁcation and Tustin (1990c) called adhesive equation, in which the
child seeks to survive by ‘sticking’ himself to visible surface characteristics of other
people. In this state, any movement can be felt to lead to a catastrophic loss of parts of
the bodily self (Tustin, 1972).
Mohammed was born in Britain to immigrant parents. From the age of three, he
was looked after by his aunt and uncle. At the time of the ﬁrst session I will
summarise, he was four years old and his therapist, Mrs. B., had been seeing him and
his aunt together once a week for some months.
Mohammed had made some important progress in that he would now turn round in
the corridor to catch Mrs. B.’s eye through the glass in a door. However, he still
ignored her during the session, made no eye contact and covered his ears with his
hands when she joined in with his sounds, as though he were worried about being
invaded. At the beginning of the session, he took two pieces of Lego over to the
window, banged them together and joined them up. He looked out of the window
when he heard a bus, and then made sounds like the engine of a bus and its doors
opening and shutting.
Mohammed repeatedly fell off chairs in the course of the session. Like Sasha, he
persistently tried to open doors and get into cupboards. He easily became frightened of
the room, and was very unwilling to go back into it after going to the toilet. Mostly
however he stood motionless for long stretches of time gazing out of the window. Mrs. B.
felt wiped out; she wished she could see his face. His aunt talked about how desperate
she was for him to improve. Mrs. B. felt desperate too: in her notes, she mentioned no
fewer than four times how overwhelmed she felt at the idea that Mohammed might
remain stuck in an unreachable state for the rest of his life. She felt completely unable to
get through to him or to see any meaning in what he was doing. She described ‘an
excruciating fear of [his] being stuck there doing this for the rest of his life. [He was]
looking at me, as though waiting for me to bring him to life, wanting me to do so – and
[I had] the feeling that I [couldn’t] do it; – [an] extreme fear that he would be stuck’.
Perhaps, she thought, she should try seeing him without his aunt: she might not feel so
completely wiped out herself.
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In fact, from the perspective of someone who was not directly affected by the
atmosphere, Mohammed seemed to be communicating a good deal. His use of
the Lego evokes to my mind a very primitive intercourse that he appeared to link with
the sound of the buses. He was on the alert for glimpses of these buses, and he himself
produced virtually continuous ‘bus sounds’ as though he were becoming the bus.
When Mrs. B. showed him a toy car, he put a Lego brick inside it, then determinedly
got the brick out again, put it in his mouth and bit it, and threw it away. This play is
less elaborated than Sasha’s play with the ‘Little Miss Tiny’ hinge, but again it seems
to imply that a favoured rival occupies a privileged space and arouses the child’s wish
to bite and eliminate it.5 This bit of play makes sense of Mohammed’s apparent fear of
being stuck in the therapy room: as though an inside space might trap him or eat him
up if he were to penetrate it through biting and throwing away a proto-baby that had
occupied it.
Admittedly, these instances of meaningful play were scattered throughout the
session. For long stretches of time Mohammed remained immobile, gazing out of the
window. I wondered whether he might have been trying to control the movement of
the buses – the alternative to control seemed to be falling or the fear of being invaded
– and I was struck by the parallel with Mrs. B.’s own ‘excruciating’ experience of
feeling immobilised.
In the event, Mrs. B. decided not to start seeing Mohammed without his aunt:
doing so might have mirrored his own apparent conviction that the way forward was to
eliminate a third party, whether by biting and throwing away the Lego brick or by
wiping out his therapist. Instead, she aimed to co-operate with his aunt in attempting to
make sense of his behaviour. The following session took place two months later, at a
different time of day.
Mohammed seemed very thrown by this change. He bounced around the room making a
continuous bus noise, reminding Mrs. B of a bird in a cage. His aunt described how he
would come into bed next to his uncle; but now that her husband was working nights, she
would ﬁnd Mohammed next to her in the mornings. Mrs. B. felt that an easy atmosphere
was developing between the two adults; but she also experienced a powerful dread that
things were stuck. She felt physically constrained and unable to think or to do anything.
Interestingly and very uncharacteristically, she did not notice a possible link when
Mohammed came and stood close to his aunt just after she had described ﬁnding him next
to her in bed.
An extended sequence followed in which Mohammed looked into the mirror, noticed that
his reﬂection disappeared when he moved away, and spent a while saying “hello” and
“bye”. He wanted to leave the room, and the adults had to place a chair in front of the
door. This seemed to help him to focus: he picked up a crayon and made a mark on some
paper, while saying something that had the contour of a sentence.
Then, on hearing the noise of a bus, he went to the window to see it, and turned around
to catch Mrs. B.’s eye. She felt that this was both to check that she was there and to invite
her to look with him at the passing bus. His hand was hovering over his genitals; when
his aunt took him to the toilet, he seemed frightened of going. Then there was another bus
sound from outside, and he went to the window with an excited little shout, which his aunt
said was something new. He noticed another window, and Mrs. B. commented, “Two
windows”. Mohammed picked up two cars and banged them together, and she agreed that
there were two cars, like him and her.
Mohammed does seem to have experienced the time change as a threat to his sense of
‘going on being’ that he attempts to counter by ceaseless physical activity (a ‘second
skin’ activity in Bick’s terms, 1968) and by producing a continuous ‘bus noise’ that
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Tustin might have called an ‘autistic shape’ (Tustin, 1984). At the same time, he
appears less stuck in that he does several new things. After the adults have enforced
the boundary of the shut door, he is able to make a mark on paper, to produce sounds
with the contour of a sentence, and to give an excited little shout when he sees another
bus through the window. He is also beginning to build meaningful sequences: both
when he stands close to his aunt after she has described ﬁnding him next to her in bed,
and when he responds to Mrs. B.’s comment, ‘two windows’, by banging two cars
together. He even makes eye contact as though to invite Mrs. B. to attend to the bus
together with him.
The point I particularly wish to highlight is the bodily nature of Mrs. B.’s response:
she felt physically constrained, not just mentally immobilised. It is as though she were
resonating with him on an adhesive, bodily level, much as Schore (2000) has described
mother and baby ‘resonating right brain to right brain’. Similarly, Mohammed seemed
frightened that physical separateness held the threat of losing his sense of self or of
disintegrating bodily. The sequence in which he repeated ‘hello’ and ‘bye’ while
playing with the disappearance and return of his reﬂection in the mirror brings to mind
Freud’s grandson, who said ‘baby fort’ and ‘baby da’ about his own mirror image
(Freud, 1920); the implication being that his own on-going existence was linked to
being able to bring back the cotton-reel standing for his mother. I would understand
Mohammed’s touching his genitals as he watched a bus pass by as the fear that its
moving away meant that he might lose part of his own body, or else his body contents
in the form of urine. The appearance of another bus would have been a reassurance,
and he welcomed it with a new, excited little shout. If this reading of the material were
plausible, it would make sense that Mohammed’s bodily anxieties should be reﬂected
in Mrs. B.’s bodily feeling of paralysis, and that, like me with Jacky, she should have
lacked the mental freedom of movement that is necessary for attaining some
perspective on the material.
Discussion
A number of central themes appear in both boys’ play, although in a more elaborated
form in Sasha’s than in Mohammed’s. These include a focus on opening and
penetrating through doors, and on biting and eliminating rival sibling ﬁgures. Both
boys are preoccupied with doing damage: in Mohammed’s case, his fear of the toilet
and the room implies paranoid anxieties concerning the possible consequences of this,
unlike Sasha’s more depressive concerns about the baby hinge that personiﬁes the link
between the parents. But with Mohammed, unlike Sasha, bodily anxieties concerning
the loss of body parts and the danger of spilling out play a major role, with the
consequence that he is less able to maintain a focus on inside spaces and relies far
more on adhesive sticking, on second-skin hyperactivity and on self-generated
sensations (Tustin’s autistic shapes) such as his continuous humming bus noises.
In her discussion of freezing and immobilisation in children with autism, Tustin
(1990a) referred to Selma Fraiberg’s formulations concerning small children’s response
to danger. Fraiberg wrote: ‘the behaviour is one of complete immobilisation, a freezing
of posture, of motility, of articulation’ (1982: 622).
Tustin (1990a: 94–5) agreed with Fraiberg’s formulation that immobilisation (‘the
other face of freezing’) ‘is a biological defence against the most extreme danger’
(1982: 623). She continued: ‘My own clinical work has convinced me that both
freezing and immobilisation (“playing possum”) are psycho-reﬂex reactions that are
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part of our biological heritage’. She thought that these were triggered to protect the
child against the extreme bodily anxieties that can accompany the awareness of being
physically separate, and which include the fear of falling, of spilling out and of losing
parts of the body that can be seen in Mohammed’s material. In resonating with such
bodily fears in the second session from which I have quoted, Mrs. B. experienced her
countertransference anxieties on a bodily level as well: in terms of a physical sense of
constraint. This, I think, stands in contrast to the situation in the ﬁrst session, in which
Mohammed was less preoccupied with bodily anxieties and more focused on inside
spaces, and in which he seemed to look at her as though asking her to bring him to
life. Her feeling of impotence may well have reﬂected the child’s inability to elicit a
lively response from parents who did not stay with him. It seems likely to be based in
projective identiﬁcation, in contrast to the strong sensation of physical constraint that
Mrs. B. experienced in the second session.
Children operating on this very primitive level can easily confuse the
communication of feelings with the loss of their body contents. This has been
described by many authors (e.g., Rey, 1979; Tustin, 1986; Grotstein, 2000; Rhode,
2004) as well as in ﬁrst person accounts (e.g., Gerland, 1996), and, alongside the
failure to conceive of inside spaces, may well be one reason why children with
moderate to severe autism cannot readily make use of projective identiﬁcation in order
to communicate feelings (see, for example, Meltzer, 1975: 18; Tustin, 1990b: 44). On
the other hand, as Durban (2014) showed in the paper I previously referred to, they
can and do elicit important bodily countertransference phenomena. The fact that the
clinician experiences these on a bodily level may imply the operation of the kind of
immediate sympathetic experience that has been described in connection with mirror
neurones (Rizzolatti and Gallese, 2003), or, as I have mentioned, in Allan Schore’s
formulations concerning mother and infant ‘resonating right brain to right brain’
(Schore, 2000). If this were the case, Mrs. B.’s experience of being physically
immobilised would rule out achieving the distance from the material that is necessary
in order to gain the sense of perspective required to notice links.
Like Mrs. B.’s response to Mohammed in the ﬁrst session, Mrs. A.’s containment
of Sasha’s anxieties about a damaged hinge-baby and the loss of precious objects seem
to be based on communicative (‘evocatory’) projective identiﬁcation. As I have said, I
believe this makes it plausible that Mrs. A.’s failure to notice the baby in the door also
followed from projective identiﬁcation: whether of Sasha’s depressed internal mother
who could not recognise his potential, or of his own feeling that a sibling ﬁgure
threatened to displace him and must be eliminated.
Finally, to return to Jacky in the light of these reﬂections on Sasha and
Mohammed: I did not at the time achieve sufﬁcient perspective to conceptualise the
immobilisation I experienced as resulting from two different pathways – from my
resonance with Jacky’s adhesive defences against extreme vulnerability and terror as
well as from the projective communication of his sadistic triumph. In the absence of
such perspective, one does not recognise that the immobilisation of one’s associations
is meaningful, and it is easy to feel that nothing is being communicated. In fact,
important communications are taking place; but some of these contain an element that
paralyses the therapist’s ability to associate and to symbolise: there is a difference in
the countertransference between those communications that can be thought about and
those that cannot. In Mohammed’s case, the bodily impact on the therapist of the
child’s adhesive defences was so great that it obscured his capacity for projective
communication. In Jacky, on the other hand, the operation of this adhesive level was
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initially masked by the presence of projective identiﬁcation, and some degree of
change only became possible through the simple recognition that his projection of
hatred was not the whole story – that sticking to me was a matter of survival.
Jacky’s material, like Mohammed’s, illustrates the degree to which one level of the
personality that is capable of communicative projective identiﬁcation can remain
unintegrated with another level at which adhesive resonance operates. Remaining
attuned as far as possible to both these levels is presumably of central importance
when our associations are immobilised. My difﬁculty in doing so with Jacky must have
contributed to his outcome at the end of treatment when, as a psychoanalyst who knew
his parents put it, he had made many developments but his core had remained
untouched.
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Notes
1. Rosenfeld (1971) describes a paralysis that is brought about through the operation of the
kind of projective identiﬁcation ﬁrst described by Klein (1946), in which parts of the self are
split off and evacuated into another person so that they can be disowned, or lodged in
another person in order to control them. He particularly stresses the extreme paralysis that is
caused by an aggressive form of parasitism, mediated by projective identiﬁcation. This is
obviously different from the communicative, ‘evocatory’ projective identiﬁcation with which
I am concerned in this paper.
2. The striking regression reported by Jacky’s parents suggests that a deﬁcit in establishing
links in the ﬁrst place (Alvarez, 1998) is likely to have been a less important factor for him
than it can be for other children on the autistic spectrum.
3. I am grateful to the two therapists for their generous permission to refer to their work.
4. Many children with autism, from Klein’s patient Dick onwards, are fascinated by doors and
door handles.
5. Similarly, Klein’s Dick bit the father doll’s head, saying, ‘Tea Daddy’, which Klein
understood as ‘eat Daddy’.
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